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“There Is Another Kingdom”:  
On The Politics of Virtue
Tracey Rowland
University of Notre Dame Australia
Sydney and Fremantle, Australia
John Milbank’s and Adrian Pabst’s The Politics of 
Virtue could be described as the theo-political analogue to Rupert 
Brooke’s The Soldier, Blake’s Jerusalem, and Sir Cecil Spring Rice’s I 
Vow to Thee my Country all rolled into one. It pulls no punches and is 
unashamedly in favor of aristocratic and monarchical forms of govern-
ment, as well as the establishment of the Church of England. God, 
Queen, and Country Anglicans who read it are likely to recall the 
words of Simeon’s prayer upon the presentation of the Christ-child: 
Nunc dimittis servum tuum, Domine, secundum verbum tuum in pace: Quia 
viderunt oculi mei salutare tuum; Quod parasti ante faciem omnium populorum: 
Lumen ad revelationem gentium, et gloriam plebis tuae Israel. 
Another way to describe it would be a twenty-first-century Tory 
manifesto or “Blue Labor” handbook. (The difference between the 
British political classifications “Red Tory” and “Blue Labor” seems 
to be more a matter of class identity than substantive policy prefer-
ence). Whether one is an aristocrat with a strong sense of noblesse 
oblige—that is, a Red or Turquoise Tory (turquoise is red combined 
with green ecological interests)—or a person from a lowlier social 
position who appreciates the value of an aristocratic element within 
the social order—a Blue Labor type—the same substantive political 
positions can be arrived at assuming a common Christian intellectual 
foundation. 
The Politics of Virtue is therefore in the genre of works that offer 
a critique of liberal political theory from a Christian perspective. It 
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shares something of the flavor of Alasdair MacIntyre’s many publi-
cations on the subject, especially the need to reclaim virtue and 
unmask the confidence tricks and coercive character of liberal ideol-
ogy. However, where MacIntyre and others have been criticized for 
offering no alternative to the present liberal political order other than 
building more monasteries, home schooling children, out-breeding 
liberals, and praying for another St. Benedict or Joseph Ratzinger 
(all reasonable strategies in my judgment), Milbank and Pabst have 
dared to offer some concrete proposals about the structure of polit-
ical institutions, as well as offering a robust defense of a Christian 
commonwealth where both politics and economics are rooted in 
virtuous practices.
While a wave of communitarian and specifically Catholic crit-
icisms of liberalism began to be published in the 1980s, often in 
response to John Rawls’s liberal classic A Theory of Justice (1971), at 
a time when it seemed as though the end-of-history theorists and 
a chorus of neoconservative Catholics might be right about the 
triumph of liberalism, and hence the enthusiasm (especially among 
American Catholics) to quickly baptise it, Milbank’s and Pabst’s 
book comes after the outbreak of Islamic terrorism in 2001 and the 
financial crisis of 2008. They note that both of these events “exposed 
the limitations of the two liberalisms that have dominated Western 
politics for the last half-century: the social-cultural liberalism of 
the left since the 1960s and the economic-political liberalism of the 
right since the 1980s.”1 The social-cultural liberalism of the left and 
the economic-political liberalism of the right share the same start-
ing position of a merely negative conception of liberty. A negative 
conception of liberty is about “freedom from” something, rather than 
“freedom for” something.
This negative liberty rests on two pillars: “a procedural, formalistic 
conception of justice and an instrumental notion of reason.”2 The 
combined result is that “individuals are proclaimed ‘autonomous’ 
when all the while they are subjected to the instrumental logic of 
bureaucratic control and commercial exchange.”3 Worse yet, “the 
scale of self-worth that the individual is encouraged to adopt is the 
1  John Milbank and Adrian Pabst, The Politics of Virtue: Post-Liberalism and the 
Human Future (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), 1.
2  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 18.
3  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 19.
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very same scale by which she is subjected to mass manipulation.”4 
The “double paradox at the heart of liberalism” is therefore the 
“relentless privatisation of the public sphere and yet the ever-greater 
invasion of the private sphere, coupled with an oppressive moral-
ism masquerading as liberal impartiality and procedural fairness.”5 
Milbank and Pabst strongly affirm the judgment of the Slovenian 
philosopher Slavoj Žižek that negative liberty has led to “an explo-
sion of legal and moral rules, an endless procession of legalization and 
moralization, presented as the fight against all forms of discrimina-
tion.” Žižek rhetorically asks: “If there are no shared mores in place 
to influence the law, just the bare fact of subjects ‘harassing’ other 
subjects, then who—in the absence of such mores—will decide what 
counts as harassment”?6 
Today, Milbank and Pabst conclude that “a new, rootless oligarchy 
now practises a manipulative populism while holding in contempt 
the genuine priorities of most people.”7 The Milbank-Pabst solu-
tion is the blend of “two older and nobler traditions: a combination 
of honourable, virtuous elites with greater popular participation; a 
greater sense of cultural duty and hierarchy of value and honour, 
alongside much more real equality and genuine creative freedom 
in the economic and political realms.”8 Included here is a notion of 
positive liberty as the search for objective truth and substantive good-
ness. The true and the good, understood as transcendental properties 
of being, are a magnet for human desire, but they do not force it. 
Unlike the operation of negative conceptions of liberty, they are not 
stealthily coercive. 
This recipe for a political order based on virtue harkens back to 
the seventeenth-century division between Whigs and Tories and 
champions the Tory line of vision. As Milbank and Pabst describe 
the history:
The crucial lines of political division appear to have run, after 
all, not between court and country, but between Whigs and 
4  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 19.
5  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 19.
6  Slavoj Žižek, “Liberalism and its Discontents,” ABC Religion and Ethics, Octo-
ber 26, 2012 (http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2012/10/26/3619378.
htm), quoted by Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 20.
7  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 2.
8  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 1–2.
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Tories who were divided over the questions of the legitimacy of 
the Hanovarian line and the primacy and independence of the 
Church in the constitution. Just this latter stress rendered the 
Tory version of commonwealth constitutional politics (remark-
ably instigated in part by none other than Charles I) more 
genuinely hospitable towards diverse corporate privileges and 
to the cultivation of genuinely virtuous roles—architectoni-
cally guided by “gentlemen”—within communities of purpose, 
purposively pursuing a collectively shared end of national and 
human excellence. By contrast, the Whigs tended to override 
all inherited rights in the interests of property—demolishing 
and removing villages, executing youthful deer-stealers and 
legitimising the ownership even of people.9
As Samuel Johnson famously said, the devil was the first Whig! 
Milbank and Pabst conclude from this that “at the heart of liberal 
self-undoing lies the primacy of the economic and the political over 
the social and thus the subordination of both social bonds and civic 
ties to the abstract standards of law and contract.”10 This was also the 
thesis of Karl Polanyi’s seminal work The Great Transformation (1944). 
For a historical understanding of the triumph of the economic and 
political over the social, Polanyi remains a leading authority. 
In the United Kingdom, the effect of the Whig ascendency 
included the replacement of the primacy of kingship as the source 
of constitutional privileges in favor of a contractual view of power. 
Virtue and honor got trumped by economic utility. Their rout was 
aided and abetted by Scottish Calvinist soteriology. In France, a simi-
lar social trajectory was fostered by the Jansenist movement, which 
is often described as Calvinism’s Catholic “twin.” According to this 
genealogy, developed in the work of Jean Rohou and endorsed by 
Milbank and Pabst, liberalism has been promoted by both seculariz-
ing hedonists and Christian puritans of both Protestant and Catholic 
disposition. However, this is only part of the historical jigsaw puzzle. 
Added to the unholy alliance of secularist hedonists and Christian 
puritans, there is another ideological army, the Rousseauian romantics 
or “Guardian/New York Times-reading, granola-eating left Liberals,” 
as Milbank and Pabst describe them. These types invert the pessimism 
of Thomas Hobbes (the idea that life in the state of nature is nasty, 
9  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 40.
10  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 58.
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brutish, and short) and see life in the state of nature as basically good. 
For these types, the “fall” occurs when one human being enters into 
a society with other human beings. They are therefore distrustful of 
what sociologists call “mediating institutions,” such as the family, 
village communities, churches, and local cultural and philanthropic 
associations. They prefer to locate all power in the state. These “new 
left” types not only influence political and economic processes but 
also exert a massive influence over educational institutions. Since they 
abhor notions of hierarchy and other gradations of excellence, includ-
ing moral excellence, their understanding of education is nothing 
like the old Greek paideia or the Christian cultivation of the various 
faculties of the soul, such as intellect, will, imagination, memory, the 
heart, and so on. Their very thin idea of education is something like 
the transfer of data from a supplier (formerly a teacher) to a consumer 
(formerly a student).11 Their opposition to notions of excellence is 
so intense they go to war against the idea that some families might 
be more excellent than others or some forms of human relationships 
are better than others or some literature or music is superior to other 
books or other scores. According to these granola-eating left liberals, 
the greatest sin is to use the human intellect to make value judgments. 
What they despise is the kind of thoroughly Christian mentality 
that Jacques Maritain displayed when he wrote that Christian habits, 
the discipline of the will, and so on are “metaphysical letters patent 
of nobility.” For these types, there can be no nobility, not even of 
the spirit. Not only do such new left ideologues control most of the 
humanities departments in the world’s elite universities; they are also 
highly influential in departments of education, family and women’s 
affairs, health, and child welfare.
In their account of the intellectual history of Western civiliza-
tion, Milbank and Pabst also observe that liberals cannot pretend 
to have invented values such as freedom, equality, toleration, indi-
vidual rights, constitutionalism, mixed and balanced government, 
the rule of law, limits on both state and market power, fair deten-
11  The author is aware that different Catholic theologians recognize different 
faculties of the human soul and some want to argue that the heart is merely 
an organ that pumps blood around the body and should not be included in a 
list of human faculties. The author, however, disagrees with this judgment and 
follows in the tradition of scholars such as John Henry Newman, Dietrich von 
Hildebrand, and Joseph Ratzinger, for whom the human heart is very much a 
concept of theological (not merely biological) significance.
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tion, fair trial, right to defense, habeas corpus, good treatment of the 
convicted, trial by peers, need of proof for guilt, and requirements 
for restitution, reparation, and rehabilitation of offenders.12 These 
ideas, they emphasize, are all of Greco-Roman or Germanic law or 
Christian provenance. They suggest that one can have all of them 
without any recourse to liberal ideology, which is a claim worth 
serious consideration.
Milbank and Pabst do acknowledge the argument, often presented 
by American neoconservatives, that nineteenth-century French 
liberalism a la de Tocqueville and Benjamin Constant is not as bad 
as British liberalism a la Hobbes and Locke, but they also argue that 
even this more benign form of liberalism gives priority to rights over 
duties and priority to the individual over the community, and thus is 
part of the noxious inheritance of late-medieval Scholasticism. Not 
only did late Scholasticism fuel the intellectual rebellion that became 
known as Protestantism, thus destroying the unity of Western Chris-
tendom and its sacramental cosmology; the late medieval notions of 
univocity (the denial of inherently different qualitative degrees within 
being), nominalism (the denial of the reality of universal modes of 
existence), and voluntarism (the insistence that divine and then 
created will is the primary determinant of reality) also reverberated 
through the field of politics. In the intellectual history recounted by 
several scholars from the Radical Orthodoxy stable (not just Milbank 
and Pabst), this trilogy of intellectual falls creates the slippery slope 
that ends with the liberalism of Rawls and other theorists who deny 
the existence of any substantive good. Rawls famously said that, if a 
man wants to spend his life counting blades of grass, then that is the 
good life for him and no one can stand on the outside of this decision 
and judge it to be a complete waste of the gift of life.
While thus acknowledging that some instantiations of liberal 
political theory may be better or worse than others, Milbank and 
Pabst nonetheless argue that, whatever good the more benign forms 
of liberalism may permit, this good is never stable. In particular, it is 
vulnerable to Hobbesian arguments about the freedom of the individ-
ual being best served by strong, centralized governments.13 The better 
of the nineteenth-century’s theories expect “tradition” (understood 
in something like a Burkean sense as long-standing social mores) to 
do the social cohesion work previously undertaken by the Christian 
12  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 29.
13  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 32–34.
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and Neoplatonic metaphysics of participation that was destroyed 
by the trio of univocity, nominalism, and voluntarism, mentioned 
above. However, Burkean notions of tradition have proven to be 
powerless before the waves of Nietzschean deconstruction. 
Milbank and Pabst also dismiss the idea that the Renaissance 
republican tradition, with its secularist conception of virtue, is a seri-
ous contender as a solution to the crisis of contemporary liberalism. 
They argue that the price of the secularization of virtue in Machia-
velli is a “re-primitivisation and re-paganisation which returns virtue 
understood as virtù to its etymological root of male aggressive prow-
ess” and renders modern virtue “proximate to liberal norms, whose 
formal negativity is predicated on the latent violence of an assumed 
initial lack of consensus.”14 In summary:
Under the aegis of liberalism, the realm of society is corroded 
from two opposite directions. On the one hand, everything 
human is declared only natural—we are a bunch of greedy apes 
with bigger brains. On the other hand, everything human is 
declared entirely artificial, just stuff that we have made up such 
as the social contract, which reflects nothing other than the 
arbitrary whims of human volition and can be simply undone 
by other acts of will. In this way, liberalism tends to make the 
human vanish in two directions: first, archaically in the face 
of the tide of pre-human nature by appealing to the lowest 
instincts such as greed, fearfulness and enmity; second, futur-
istically, in favour of a “post-human” project that can hope-
fully subordinate human egotism and the unpredictabilities 
of desire to a cybernetic future that will augment the liberal 
“peace of a sort” into an absolute bio-politics. In this way, the 
consummation of liberalism’s inevitable utilitarian inversion 
ushers in a phase of history that is both post-democratic and 
post-humanist.15
Milbank and Pabst conclude that the history of the century 
(1914–2014) suggests that, “if the state does not acknowledge the 
need to be guided by higher principles than power or wealth, then 
one of two consequences will ensure: either the state invests poli-
tics and the economy with quasi-sacred significance, like Fascism, 
14  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 37.
15  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 58.
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Communism and Neo-liberalism, or else the state ends up adopting 
a political religion with theocratic tendencies.”16 Like MacIntyre, 
William Cavanaugh, David L. Schindler, and several other leading 
Catholic scholars, Milbank and Pabst declare the liberal tradition to 
be flawed in its foundations. They therefore seek to re-weave the fabric 
of the social tapestry that got torn apart by the successive waves of 
univocity, nominalism, and voluntarism and to rescue what remains 
intact of the tapestry and give it a new lease on life with some strong 
arguments in favor of its superiority over liberal social forms.17 
Their concrete proposals include directly electing mayors, affirm-
ing local government and regional identities, reviving the old guild-
halls, reforming the Privy Council so that it is not merely another 
arm of the executive branch of government, reforming the House 
of Lords so that it becomes a House of a diverse array of social and 
professional elites, reforming the House of Commons by getting rid 
of the simple “first past the post” principle, allowing for some of the 
larger electorates to return more than one Member of Parliament and 
bringing in other changes to break up the monopoly of the two-party 
system, and finally, establishing more Royal Colleges for a wider 
range of vocations. 
In relation to the reform of the House of Lords, it is recommended 
that hereditary peers be included, not dropped, and that their role 
should include a special brief for ecological guardianship. Precisely 
how this might look in practice is not developed, but one thinks of 
Prince Charles’s many projects to promote the economic viability 
of the British villages and to protect the countryside from being 
destroyed by philistine property developers. It is probably this kind 
of work that Milbank and Pabst have in mind. There has always been 
a close association between the National Trust and the aristocracy. 
Both try to preserve the natural and cultural treasures of the United 
Kingdom.
Milbank and Pabst want to retain the aristocratic element in Brit-
ish society and to affirm all the good community work that many of 
the aristocratic families already do, especially in the fields of ecolog-
ical and cultural treasure preservation. Above all, they want the 
Royal Family to have a significant political role and not be reduced 
16  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 234.
17  The “re-weaving the tapestry” metaphor is taken from the title of Hans Boers-
ma’s book Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011).
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to a “mere ceremonial apex upon a capitalist spectacle.” They argue 
that missing from contemporary liberal democracies are “genuine 
elites”—“virtuous inspirers and architectonic leaders that act honour-
ably and lead by example in all sectors of society.”18 They further 
argue that there needs to be a symbolization of the pursuit of the 
good at a hierarchical summit.19 The monarchy serves this purpose, 
which they describe in the following terms:
The personal role of the monarch exceeds the impersonal forces 
of the nation, the state or the market, reminding us at the top 
that the entire edifice of structure and process is in the end a 
human worker, a human emergence, dependent on an amal-
gam of private human decisions. For this reason, monarchy can 
today symbolically and actively uphold the sanctity of labour 
(human beings are first and foremost works), land (the shared 
commons) and life (the dignity of the human person). The 
House of Windsor has to some degree already, and commend-
ably, started to take on this international role—even if it could 
be greatly extended, to potential global benefit, potentially 
somewhat reviving at a supranational level the lapsed (but argu-
ably theo-politically indispensable) role of the Holy Roman 
Emperor in the older polity of Christendom.20
The pair even go so far as to refer to the “Christological media-
tion” of the British monarch, who is “answerable to a higher author-
ity than simply his own private inner conscience.”21 As Roger Trigg 
explains:
In England, the Cross on top of the Crown, coupled with the 
symbolism of the Coronation service, demonstrate the fact 
that temporal power is not the final source of authority, but is 
itself answerable to a higher Power. The Queen, personifying 
all government in this land, is subject to principles and stan-
dards that are not the making of herself or her ministers. All 
are under the ultimate judgment of the God who created all. 
Denying that is to make something else, whether the interest of 
18  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 205
19  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 219.
20  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 40.
21  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 219.
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the stronger, or the fickle will of the people, an untrustworthy 
guide.22
Such an exhortation in favor of monarchical forms of government 
is rarely to be found in contemporary Anglophone Catholic litera-
ture, with the notable exception of the works of the English Domin-
ican Aidan Nichols. As Robert P. Kraynak has noted, according to 
thinkers like Nichols, “the deficiency of democratic and republican 
forms is the inability to sustain the high culture and civic piety that 
monarchical and aristocratic forms once cultivated as a matter of 
course and that helped to sustain a Christian civilisation with loftier 
aspirations than bourgeois culture.”23 Nonetheless, perhaps because of 
the lingering Fenian influence in Anglophone Catholicism, the natu-
ral Catholic affinity for some form of Christian monarchy is far less 
pronounced in Anglophone publications than it is in French publi-
cations. A contemporary joke is that the French College in Rome is 
politically divided between the Légitimistes and Orléanistes, the abso-
lute monarchists and the constitutional monarchists. Republicans, 
apparently, are nowhere to be found. Although it is hard to believe 
that a few Gaullists have not slipped through the net somewhere, 
the caricature is not hard to believe, since the Republican tradi-
tion in France is so notoriously anti-Catholic. The memory of the 
Republican suppression of the Vendée, not merely the Republican 
defeat of the Royal and Catholic Army, but the wholesale genocide 
of the civilian population, women and babies included, runs so deep 
in French Catholic culture that it makes a “baptism” of the French 
revolution very difficult. The English historian Simon Schama has 
described the suppression of the Vendée in 1793 as the first exam-
ple of genocide in modern history. Even the largest buckets of holy 
water are inadequate to heal the lesion caused by the murder of some 
hundreds of thousands of people, including the so-called Republican 
“baptisms,” or deliberate drowning, in the Loire River. Famously, 
the only uniform of those peasants and aristocrats who together 
formed the Royal and Catholic Army was a cloth badge in the shape 
of the Sacred Heart sewn into their shirts.
Recently, the memory of the heroism of the Vendeans was recalled 
by Cardinal Robert Sarah, whose home is the former French colony 
22  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 219.
23  Robert P. Kraynak, Christian Faith and Modern Democracy: God and Politics in a 
Fallen World (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 233.
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of Guinea. He described advocates of abortion and population control 
in Africa as being like the Republican revolutionaries who massacred 
the people of the Vendée, and he rhetorically asked: “Who will dare 
to confront the modern persecutors of the Church? Who will have 
the courage to rise up without any weapons other than the rosary 
and the Sacred Heart, to face the columns of death of our time?” He 
further described the “columns of death” as relativism, indifferent-
ism, and contempt for God. He said that the contemporary revolu-
tionaries, like the revolutionary Republicans, want to exterminate 
families. He predicted that Africa, like the Vendée, will resist, and 
he exhorted the French people to do the same. He concluded with 
the statement: “My friends, the blood of martyrs flows in your veins, 
be faithful to it! We are all spiritually sons of la Vendée martyrs.”24
While Milbank, Pabst, and Nichols agree about many aspects of 
the argument in favor of the British monarchy, where they differ is 
over the significance of the Church of England. Quite simply, Nich-
ols, on the one hand, and Milbank and Pabst, on the other, offer two 
different meta-narratives about the place of the Church of England 
in British history. According to Milbank and Pabst, “after Henry 
VIII’s break with Rome, the Church of England eventually sought to 
preserve the balance between priesthood and monarchy that reflects 
the patristic and medieval emphasis on Christ’s priestly and kingly 
authority.”25 According to Nichols:
With the Protestant Reformation—first Henrician-Edwardine 
and then, after the intermezzo of Mary’s reign, Elizabethan—
the English Crown (in Parliament or not as the case may be) 
destroyed the relative autonomy of sacerdotium in its relation to 
regnum. In Western Christendom that autonomy had always 
been guaranteed in principle, however fluctuating it was in 
practice, by the “de-centredness” of the national Church which 
recognised the chief seat of ecclesial authority in the See of 
Rome. . . . The English reformation was, then, the action of 
the Crown in establishing control over the Church, far more 
fully than in the Middle Ages and with a systematic repudia-
24  Nick Hallet, “Cardinal Sarah: The New Revolutionaries are Trying to Destroy 
the Christian Family,” The Catholic Herald, August 16, 2017, catholicherald.
co.uk/news/2017/08/16/cardinal-sarah-the-new-revolutionaries-are-trying-
to-destroy-the-christian-family/.
25  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 233.
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tion of the claims of the See of Rome. Within this broadish 
framework much that was Catholic could survive, but in a form 
vulnerable to theological fashion, political events and—in the 
setting of mass democracy in the twentieth century—cultural 
trends.26 
Milbank and Pabst defend the established position of the Church 
of England and argue that the political role of the established Church 
is “neither to sanctify the state nor to supplant the government as 
elected and representative, but, rather, to ‘inform’ public institutions 
in the direction of both individual virtue and public honour, with-
out which democracy cannot function or thrive.”27 The Church of 
England is also praised for sustaining a parish system that helps to 
structure and coordinate local life in diverse ways.28 Other faiths, 
they suggest, can come to occupy the same space in a “quasi-estab-
lished fashion.” Specific mention is made of the Catholic, Jewish, and 
Islamic faiths in this context. 
Notwithstanding this offer to somehow “share the space,” we are 
still left with an Act of Settlement that precludes the monarch from 
ever being a Catholic and we have the Church of England occupying 
property that was taken from the Catholic Church in a civil war that 
destroyed almost all the Benedictine monasteries. The monastic trea-
sure and property was plundered by the crown and often distributed 
to socially significant families who would support Henry’s cause. 
The parish structure that currently offers tea and sympathy across the 
villages of the Kingdom pre-dates the Church of England. England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were Catholic territories for 
some 1,000 years before Henry VIII had a fight with Pope Clement 
VII about divorce and remarriage. Bishop John Fisher, the Lord High 
Chancellor Sir Thomas More, and some of the best and brightest men 
and women of the Kingdom went to the gallows because they refused 
to accept Henry’s new morality. 
In one place, Milbank and Pabst observe that “to do something 
wrong is also to do something badly, to botch things up in a way that 
is bound sooner or later (even if decades or centuries later) to fail, 
26  Aidan Nichols, The Realm: An Unfashionable Essay on the Conversion of England 
(Oxford, UK: Family Publications, 2007), 51–52. 
27  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 232.
28  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 238.
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because vices are hard to sustain and ultimately self-defeating.”29 The 
fundamental difference of Milbank and Pabst from Catholic monar-
chists is that the Catholics believe that Henry VIII and those social 
climbers who supported him got something wrong and botched things 
up and so his project is bound to fail, even if centuries later, because, as 
they say, vices are hard to sustain and ultimately self-defeating. 
The “vice” at the root of the Church of England is its weak moral 
theology, beginning with Henry’s attack on the indissolubility of 
marriage. It is precisely the area of sexual morality and the theological 
significance of gender distinctions that today is most definitive of the 
difference between the Catholic Church and the Church of England. 
Edmund Adamus has gone so far as to argue that it is precisely because 
of decisions made by Church of England leaders in the twentieth 
century in these fields that London has become, in his judgment, “the 
epicentre of the culture of death.” Adamus traces the contemporary 
culture of death to the decision of the Lambeth Conference of 1930 
to permit contraception, thereby accepting a severance of the procre-
ative from the unitive dimensions of human sexuality. In his “The 
Body’s Grace” lecture, Dr. Rowan Williams, the former Archbishop 
of Canterbury, acknowledged that this decision about contraception 
had, as a matter of logic, opened the gate to an acceptance of homo-
sexuality, though he does not see this as a problem. 
In the context of a discussion about liberalism’s failure to recognize 
the existence of the human soul, Milbank and Pabst refer to Belgium’s 
euthanasia laws as an instance of the triumph of what St. John Paul II 
called a “culture of death.”30 A whole doctoral thesis could be written 
on the subject of whether London or Leuven (home of the “Catho-
lic” University where a philosophy professor was recently sacked for 
presenting a prolife argument to his students) is the epicentre of the 
culture of death.31 Indeed, one may well conclude that London is the 
epicenter of the culture of death in its Protestant form and Leuven 
in its Catholic form. Whatever of that issue, the fact is that, from 
a Catholic perspective, Milbank’s and Pabst’s anti-liberalism is not 
quite anti-liberal enough, since they have missed drilling down to 
one of the major roots of Britain’s social decay—the botched jobs of 
the Henrician and Elizabethan “root canal fillings” as they manifest 
29  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 6.
30  Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 274.
31  Tom Heneghan, “Catholic University in Belgium Sacks Lecturer Who Called 
Abortion ‘the Murder of an Innocent Person,’” The Tablet, April 10, 2017.
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themselves today in the almost complete failure of the Church of 
England’s leaders to offer any kind of intellectual and spiritual resis-
tance to the sexual revolution of the 1960s. As many have noted, 
today it is neither the Anglo-Catholics nor the Calvinists who domi-
nate the Church of England, but the liberal party. Thomas Howard 
in his “Lead Kindly Light” interview summed up the situation in the 
following terms:
The Anglicanism/Episcopalianism of today differs violently 
from the Church (of England) into which I was received in 
l960. Back then, the worst feature of the Anglican commu-
nion was sheer Modernism, which had taken over 100% of the 
seminaries in the U.S., and 19% of the parishes and priests. But 
now, that Modernism (springing as it did from l9th century 
German biblical criticism whose axiom was that miracles don’t 
occur, hence the Bible is a tissue of fairy tales) has reached its 
tentacles into the moral realm, and, whereas most Episcopal 
clergy back then would have vaguely espoused the general 
tradition of Western decency, now they are loud and vicious in 
their insistence on re-drawing the moral map of the universe. 
It is an inevitable development, but nonetheless shocking and 
dismaying.32
In the final analysis, The Politics of Virtue may well become as 
influential as MacIntyre’s After Virtue or Rawls’s Theory of Justice. It is 
certainly a powerful critique of the crisis of modern liberalism and 
the economic and cultural orders it has engendered. In these most 
unaristocratic times, when the liberal tradition now takes the form of 
a totalitarian intolerance of almost all standards of excellence, Queen 
Elizabeth II is a quietly dignified counter-force. She is also arguably 
the most widely respected world leader today. She has taken her coro-
nation oath to defend the Christian faith in the countries of her realm 
seriously, even though, by Catholic standards, she has not been as 
heroic as King Baudouin of Belgium, who abdicated for a day rather 
than have his name attached to pro-abortion legislation, or Archduke 
Henri of Luxembourg, who refused to have his name associated with 
pro-euthanasia legislation. Queen Elizabeth II is often held up as 
the quintessential example of a servant leader, since she has devoted 
32  Thomas Howard, “Lead Kindly Light,” ignatiusinsight.com/features/thow-
ard_intrvw_oct04.asp. 
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decades of her life to self-sacrificial public service. British Common-
wealth Catholics who care about the Christian fabric of their nations 
should be natural supporters of the monarchy. However, this does not 
mean that they have to give up on the project of restoring the “old 
faith” in the British Isles. Rather, they should rally behind the cause 
of the Servant of God Fr. Ignatius Spencer, great-great-great uncle 
of Diana, the Princess of Wales, and pray for the conversion of the 
British crown. 
There is a story that, when Bishop Ullathorne of Birmingham, 
who was a lineal descendent of St. Thomas More, had a meeting with 
St. John Vianney in 1854, Vianney said to Ullathorne: “Monseigneur, 
I believe that the Church in England will one day be restored to her 
former glory.” If only the British Catholic bishops were to believe 
this and pray for it and encourage Her Majesty’s Catholic subjects to 
do the same! Until such time, however, scholars like Milbank and 
Pabst and their Catholic sympathizers need to work together against 
all those forces who seek to snuff out every spark of grace and nobility 
in what Shakespeare called “the sceptred isle.” N&V
